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Preservation:

This issue w a s preserved in Argonaut's Objection to Proposed Order

and Motion for Hearing on Remaining Issues HCUJK IIUS . i ai

•

;

*: ,.

.-. :)..

\ i :. i

> -

:

i

.1 -.;,«*( ,o j-,,i.

ffs'

b objection to

t:tc hnU>, and Argonaut Insurance C o m p a n y ' s Objection to Judgment. 4

^ v

Standard

of Review: "Constitutional issues, including that of due process, are

questions of law w i n d i [tl le coi irt] review [s] for correctness." : : ) ' I lie Sii.pi ei i. le Coi u t
reviews a disti ic t ecu irt's t i ilii igs : i it i r i< :>tic:>i is i n idei I Itah "Rules of Civil Procedure Rules
59 anu oO ioi an abuse of discretion. 6

'R. I 3 3 4 d 3 3 \
2

]'

3

R. 1454-1455.

4

i

::

1449.

».

5

State in Interest of KM.

^Warren v / )/\ ( ;// (\\

0<n P 2d 576, 578 (Utah A p p 7 098).

II.

Whether the court was incorrect not to enter judgment against Wadman
Corporation who was the statutory employer as previously found by this court.
Preservation: This issues was preserved in Argonaut Insurance Company's

Objection to Judgment.7
Standard of Review: "A motion or action to modify a final judgment is addressed
to the discretion of the trial court, the exercise of which must be based on sound legal
principles in light of all relevant circumstances."8
III.

Whether the court abused its discretion by failing to take evidence on the status of
the relationship between Argonaut and Wadman.
Preservation: This issue was preserved in Argonaut's Objection to Proposed Order

and Motion for Hearing on Remaining Issues Before this Court,9 Objection to Plaintiffs'
and Wadman's Motion to Enter Judgment,10 and Argonaut Insurance Company's
Objection to the Minute Entry.11
Standard of Review: Appellate Courts review a district court's decision to not
allow evidence for an abuse of discretion.12

"Id.
*Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993).
9

R. 1334-1335.

10

R. 1448-1449.

n
n

R. 1454-1455.
Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2009 UT App 35, ^[9, 204 P.3d 204.
2

IV.

Whether the Labor Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine allowable
benefits when they are in dispute and whether interest should be charged and at
what rate.
Preservation: This was preserved in Argonaut Insurance Company's Objection to

Judgment.13
Standard of Review: "Whether the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine entitlement to workers' compensation benefits \s an issue of law subject to a
correctness standard of review."14
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
United States Constitution Amendment XIV § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United State^, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State jvherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person withii^ its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Utah Constitution Article I § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)(2)
How assessed. The party who claims his costs mufet within five days after the entry
of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom (posts are claimed, a copy of a

13

R. 1519-1520.

u

Sheppick v. Albertson 's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769, 773 |(Utah 1996).
3

memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file
with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to the affiant's
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily
incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may,
within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill
of costs taxed by the court.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but
before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the
date judgment is entered.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(1), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes;
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a new judgment:
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having
a fair trial.
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that
it is against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
4

denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or o^her misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been [satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (West 2010)
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, &oods, or chose in action shall
be 10% per annum.
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (West 2010)
(3)(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, other (bivil and criminal judgments of
the district court and justice court shall bear interest at th^ federal postjudgment interest
rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(2) (West 2002)
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and
hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall
be:
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance barrier; and
(b) not on the employee.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(ll)(a) (West 2002)
(1 l)(a) Subject to appellate review under Section j$4A-l-303, the commission has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine whether the {reatment or services rendered to
employees by physicians, surgeons, or other health providers are:
(i) reasonably related to industrial injuries or occupational diseases; and
(ii) compensable pursuant to this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease
Act.
5

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(3) (West 2002)
(3) Awards made by final order of the commission shall include interest at the rate
of 8% per annum from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become
due and payable.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case originated with a declaratory judgment action requesting the court to
declare duties of the parties involved in the construction of the Santa Clara Intermediate
School (the "Project") for Washington County School District which elected to participate
in the Owner Controlled Insurance Program ("OOP") sponsored by the State of Utah.
The main dispute is who is responsible to pay workers' compensation benefits to Cory
Searle ("Mr. Searle"), an employee of Iverson Steel and Erection Company ("Iverson")
who was injured while working on the Project.15 Argonaut Insurance Company
("Argonaut") filed a motion for summary judgment against Iverson Steel claiming that no
contract existed between them and thus no coverage could be afforded to its employee.16
The district court granted the motion and WCF appealed. This Court found that no
contract existed between Argonaut and Iverson, but that Argonaut would have to pay Mr.
Searle's benefits because it was the insurance carrier for Wadman Corporation

15

R. 135.

16

R. 424-553.
6

("Wadman"), the statutory employer of Mr. Searle.17 It thqn remanded the case to the
district court for "action consistent with this opinion."18
On remand, Argonaut requested a hearing to allow the court to determine the
policy between Wadman and Argonaut and the amount or benefits due to Mr. Searle.19
The coverage under the insurance policy had never been before the district court and Mr.
Searle's benefits had not been determined by the Labor Commission, which has exclusive
jurisdiction over the determination of benefits. Without a resolution of these issues,
proper damages could not be assessed. Despite Argonaut' s objections, the district court
entered judgment based on a judgment submitted by WCIf. Because the district court
overruled Argonaut's objections, it did not have an opportunity to present contrary
evidence to the damages, costs, and interest submitted by |WCF. Argonaut appeals the
entry of judgment by the district court.
STATEMENT OF FAClfS
Nature of the Case: The Washington County Schobl District was the owner of the
Project and Wadman was the successful bidder to be the general contractor for the
Project.20 As part of the bid specifications, the requirements of the State of Utah OCIP
Manual were incorporated into the final contract betweerj Wadman and the Washington

17

R.1332.

l

* Workers' Compensation Fund v. Wadman, 2009 JUT 18, f U , 210 P.3d 277.

19

R. 1334-1335.

20"

R. 137.

County School District.21 The OCIP Manual states that it does not provide coverage
interpretations and that the policy governs.22 After the project began, Wadman hired
Iverson because its original steel erection subcontractor was behind schedule.23 Iverson
began work on January 28, 2002.24 On February 7, 2002, Mr. Searle was injured when he
fell from a second story level to the concrete floor below.25 Iverson's enrollment form
was submitted on February 8, 2002.26 Argonaut issued a workers' compensation policy to
Iverson effective February 8, 2002.27 The case was filed as a declaratory relief action to
determine who was responsible to pay benefits to Mr. Searle.28
Procedural History: This case originated in May of 2002 when the Workers'
Compensation Fund ("WCF") filed a complaint for declaratory relief against the State of
Utah Department of Administrative Services, Department of Risk Management, Willis of
Utah, Inc., Washington County School District, Wadman, and Argonaut.29 Iverson

21

R. 462.

22

R. 581.

23

R. 506-507.

24

R. 519.

25

R. 525-526

26

R. 499.

27

R. 529.

28

R. 135.

29

R. 1-12.
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assigned its rights to WCF30 and WCF filed an amended complaint naming itself and
Iverson as plaintiffs on November 1, 2002.31 After discovery, Argonaut filed a motion for
summary judgment.32 The motion was based on the fact that Argonaut did not have a
contract of insurance with Iverson or Mr. Searle.33 All defendants but Wadman also filed
motions for summary judgment.34 WCF stipulated to a dismissal of Willis of Utah, Inc.35
The district court granted the motions for summary judgment and Argonaut, State of Utah
Department of Administrative Services, Division of Risk Management, and Washington
County School District were dismissed from the case with prejudice

36

WCF and Iverson appealed the orders granting summary judgment.37 Wadman also
appealed.38 After the appeal was filed, but before oral argument, WCF settled with
Washington School District and the Division of Risk Management.39 Prior to a mediation,

30

R. 56-58.

31

R. 149 and 134-147.

^ R 424-426.
33

R. 435.

34

R. 554-705.

35

R. 1225-1230.

36

R. 1237-1251.

37

R. 1252-1254.

38

R. 1264.

39

R. 1289-1291.

Wadman assigned its Rights to WCF.40 WCF advanced four reasons that Argonaut was
responsible to pay the benefits to Mr. Searle. Those arguments were (1) Wadman was
Argonaut's agent, (2) Iverson's employees were loaned employees, (3) Argonaut must
provide coverage because the Project was an OCIP project and Argonaut was the OCIP
insurer, and (4) Wadman was the statutory employer of Mr. Searle and Argonaut must
provide coverage as Wadman's insurer.41
This Court rejected all but the last of WCF's arguments.42 This Court found
Wadman to be Mr. Searle's statutory employer, that Argonaut was Wadman's insurance
carrier, and remanded the case to the district court for action consistent with its opinion.43
Once back in the district court, Argonaut objected to WCF's proposed order and made a
motion for a hearing on the remaining issues.44 Specifically, Argonaut sought a review of
the policy that controlled the relationship between Argonaut and Wadman and an
opportunity to present evidence regarding issues not addressed by this Court pursuant to
its due process rights.45 Argonaut also filed an Objection to Plaintiffs' and Wadman's
Motion to Enter Judgment again stressing the need for the determination of evidentiary

40

R. 1302

"Id.
42

R. 1322.

43

R. 1332.

44

R. 1334-1335.

45

R. 1338-1341.
10

issues.46 The district court overruled Argonaut's objection^ finding there were no issues
remaining.47 Argonaut objected to this judgment.48 This objection was also overruled and
the district court and entered judgment against Argonaut 4* Argonaut objected the
judgment asserting that it should have been entered against Wadman, the support for
damages was insufficient and inconsistent with applicable law, and that the Labor
Commission should determine the benefits due to Mr. Seqrle.50 The district court again
overruled Argonaut's objection and entered a final judgment on February 10, 2010.51
Argonaut filed its Notice of Appeal on March 8, 2010.52
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court erred when it overruled Argonauts objections and motions in
opposition to the entry of judgment. Specifically, the district court should have allowed a
hearing on damages, entered judgment against Wadman Corporation, and taken evidence
on the relationship between Argonaut and Wadman. Also] the district court lacked
jurisdiction to determine the workers' compensation benefits due to Mr. Searle and

46

R. 1448-1449.

47

R. 1451-1452.

48

R. 1454-1455.

49

R. 1476-1482.

50

R. 1519-1520.

51

R. 1533.

R. 1548.
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applied the wrong interest rate.
No Hearing on Damages: The district court entered judgment against Argonaut for
$790,484.59 based on cursory support by WCF and not allowing Argonaut to present
evidence in violation of Argonaut's due process rights. Argonaut made several objections
putting the district court on notice that its rights were in jeopardy. Argonaut also objected
after the judgment was entered, giving the district court the opportunity to correct the
error pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and/or 60. The district court should
have allowed a hearing to determine the proper amount of damages.
No Judgment Against Wadman: This Court previously found that Wadman
Corporation was the statutory employer of Mr. Searle. The Workers' Compensation Act
requires that employers and their insurance carriers be responsible for the payment of
benefits. The district court's refusal to include Wadman on the judgment was a violation
of the Workers' Compensation Act and prior Utah case law.
No Evidence on the Relationship Between Wadman and Argonaut: The district
court ruled that all coverage issues were determined by the Supreme Court. However, the
OCIP Manual clearly states that the policy governs any coverage interpretations. The
policy at issue in this case has never been put in evidence or interpreted by the court.
Before Argonaut can be required to pay Mr. Searle's benefits, the policy must be
interpreted to determine the type and amount of benefits to which Mr. Searle is entitled.
Labor Commission has Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Benefits: In entering judgment
against Argonaut, the trial court effectively determined the type and amount of workers'
12

compensation benefits due to Mr. Searle. The Workers' Compensation Act gives the
Labor Commission exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of benefits. The district
court recognized this in its judgment. Despite it knowledge of the Labor Commission's
jurisdiction, the district court set the benefits for Mr. Searle. Argonaut should have the
opportunity to defend Mr. Searle's claims in front of the Labor Commission.
In addition, the district court used interest rates app icable to contracts in its
judgment. The Workers' Compensation Act sets the interest rate for workers'
compensation claims and this Act governs the benefits due in this case. The district
court's judgment should be corrected using the correct interest rate.
ARGUMENT
I.

Whether the Judgment Entered on January 11, zOlO was allowed when the
defendant requested a hearing so that damages could be contested
After receiving the case on remand, Judge Lindber^ entered a preliminary

judgment on January 11, 2010 based on a proposed order drafted by the WCF.53 This
judgment was finalized on February 10, 2010.54 However, Argonaut objected to the
WCF's proposed order prior to the entry of the January 11|, 2010 order.
On September 10, 2009, Argonaut filed its Objection to Proposed Order and
Motion for Hearing on Remaining Issues Before this Cou|t, pursuant to plaintiffs

53

R. 1476.

54

R. 1533.
13

complaint for declaratory relief.55 One of the remaining issues before the trial court was
the amount of damages. Argonaut again objected to the WCF's Motion to Enter Judgment
on October 14, 2009.56 The WCF's proposed order ignored several evidentiary issues
such as the amount of damages that the trial court needed to rule upon.
Despite these objections and the need for a hearing to determine the amount of
damages, Judge Lindberg entered a minute entry on December 11, 2009 overruling
Argonaut's objections.57 However, in overruling the objections, the trial court also
recognized that Argonaut should have the opportunity to present a defense regarding
damages. The court stated
once the Court has received and reviewed WCF's memorandum in support
of taxable costs and "necessary disbursements in the action," and Argonaut
has had an opportunity to respond, see Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(2), the Court will consider the submissions and, as necessary, enter
an appropriate supplement to the Judgment.58

Argonaut was never given an opportunity to respond. Argonaut objected to the
Minute Entry again asking that the "proper evidence be evaluated before an Order
is actually entered ...,"59 WCF filed its memorandum in opposition to this objection

R. 1334-1335.
»R. 1448-1449.
'R. 1451-1451.
:

R. 1451 (emphasis added).

R.1455.
14

on December 22, 2009.60 Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(1),
Argonaut should have had the opportunity to file a reply memorandum. Instead,
the trial court entered a judgment on January 11, 2010.61
The district court's entry of judgment was imprope^. Argonaut objected to
the entry of this judgment because it allowed WCF to recolver administrative costs,
adds prejudgment interest, and because the Labor Commission has exclusive
jurisdiction over determining the amount of monies paid.6] This judgment was also
inconsistent with this Court's prior decision in this case. This Court found that
Wadman was the statutory employer of Mr. Searle and remanded the case back to
the district court for "action consistent with this opinion.' >63 On remand, the proper
action for the district court would be to enter a judgment stating that Wadman was
the statutory employer of Mr. Searle and then transfer the case to the Labor
Commission to determine the benefits due to Mr. Searle. instead, the district court
entered judgment against Argonaut and awarding WCF damages it was not entitled
to receive.
Because the district court did not follow this Court 's decision, Argonaut
never had an opportunity to rebut the damages claimed by WCF. WCF filed for
60

R. 1457.

61

R. 1476 and 1478-1482.

62

R.1519-1520.

63

Workers' Compensation Fund v. Wadman Corp.,|2009 UT 18, ^ 41, 210 P.3d 277.
15

declaratory relief in this action asking the court to determine who was responsible
to pay workers' compensation benefits..64 The district court's award of damages to
WCF including administrative costs and interest at 10% exceeded the relief sought
in the complaint for declaratory relief. WCF's action for declaratory relief does not
entitle it to administrative costs or interest at 10%. Although the Utah Declaratory
Judgment Act allows a court to provide supplementary relief, it also requires that
the adverse party be allowed to respond.65 Despite these objections, the trial court
finalized its judgment on February 10, 201066 without giving Argonaut the
opportunity to respond to WCF's claims to damages. The trial court erred in
entering judgment against the objections of Argonaut.
The district court's failure to hold a hearing on damages violated Argonaut's due
process rights. Also, the district court's overruling of Argonaut's objections to the
judgment constituted an abuse of discretion in violation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
59 and/or 60.
A.

The District Court's Failure to Hold a Hearing on Damages Violated
Argonaut's Due Process Rights.

The trial court's entry of judgment on January 11, 2010, which was finalized on
February 10, 2010, without allowing a hearing regarding damages deprived Argonaut of

64

R. 134, 135.

65

See Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 78-33-8 (2002).

66

R. 1533.
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its right to due process of law. The trial court's actions denied Argonaut the opportunity
to defend itself from WCF's claims of damages. "An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."67
Argonaut has not been allowed to present its objections.
Argonaut has not been afforded the opportunity to present its objections to the
amount of damages because the district court refused to alfow a hearing. Instead, the
district court accepted the amount of damages unilaterally set by WCF. The only support
provided by WCF as to the amount of damages were cursory computer printouts.68 These
printouts had no foundation and do little to support WCF's claim to damages. Also, the
WCF failed to provide any evidence of the administrative bosts incurred or cite any
authority showing they are authorized to receive such costte. Argonaut is entitled to have
WCF prove the amount of damages and present its own evidence regarding damages.
'Parties to a judicial proceeding are entitled to notice 'thai a particular issue is being
considered by a court' and must be given 'an opportunity TO present evidence and

61

Jackson Construction Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 80, flO, 100 P.3d 1211 (quoting
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 30^, 314 (1950)).
68

R. 1514 and 1518.
R. 1481.
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argument on that issue before decision." 70 Also, "[i]t is elementary that a court may not
make findings binding upon a defendant without a hearing, or an opportunity to be
heard." 71 Argonaut was not provided an opportunity to present evidence regarding
damages in violation of its due process rights guaranteed by the United States and Utah
Constitutions. 72
B.

The District Court Abused its Discretion in Not Treating Argonaut's
Objections as Motions Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and/or
60.

Additionally, WCF has argued that there is no Utah Rule of Civil Procedure that
allows Argonaut to seek relief from the judgment entered against it.73 However, there are
at least two rules that allow Argonaut to challenge the judgment entered in this case.
Those rules are Rule 59 and Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
1.

Argonaut's objections to the judgment should be treated as a
motion for new trial or amendment of judgment under Rule 59.

Rule 59(a) provides
on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may
open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony,
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and

70

State in Interest of KM, 965 P.2d 576, 579 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Plumb v.
State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990).
lx

Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 51 P.2d 645, 660 (Utah 1935).

11

13

See U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1 and Utah Constitution Article I § 7.

See R. 1463 (WCF is "unaware of any Utah Rule of Civil Procedure that provides
for such redundant pleadings.") and R. 1523 ("Once again, Argonaut cites to no Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure or other authority for its right to object at this procedural point....").
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conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment
Such action by the trial court is allowed under a variety o circumstances. Those that are
applicable to this case are irregularity in the proceedings of the court by which either
party was prevented from having a fair trial, excessive or inadequate damages,
74
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, and error in law.

Argonaut was not afforded a fair trial because it was not allowed a hearing on
damages. The damages awarded against Argonaut are likely excessive because Argonaut
has not been given the opportunity to rebut the claims of WCF. Finally, the evidence
presented by WCF as to damages is insufficient to justify) the award. WCF only provides
two pieces of paper to justify $790,484.59 in damages.
The fact that Argonaut's filings were captioned "objections" rather than "motions
for new trial" is immaterial. "If the nature of the motion can be ascertained from the
substance of the instrument,... an improper caption is not fatal to that motion.»75
Argonaut's objections clearly stated that the entry of judgment would be and was
improper. Argonaut's objections were sufficient to act as motions for new trial or
amendment of judgment and the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing
Argonaut to present evidence to rebut WCF's claims as t<p the amount and nature of
damages.

74

See Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1), (a)(5) (a)(6) and (a)(7).

75

Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 13^6, 1348 (Utah 1983). See also
Howard v. Howard, 356 P.2d 275, 276 (Utah 1960).
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2.

Argonaut's objections should be treated as a motion for relief
from judgment or order pursuant to Rule 60(b).

If Argonaut's objections cannot be considered as a motion for new trial pursuant
to Rule 59, the objections should be treated as motions for relief from judgment pursuant
to Rule 60(b). This rule provides that uon motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party ... from a final judgment."76 Relief
from a final judgment is allowed for any reason "justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment."77 As was noted above, the fact that the objections may not have been
correctly captioned is immaterial.
"It is well established that 60(b) motions should be liberally granted because of
the equitable nature of the rule. Therefore, a district court should exercise its discretion
in favor of granting relief so that controversies can be decided on the merits rather than
on technicalities."78 Argonaut was deprived of an opportunity to address the damages
issue on the merits because the trial court refused to have a hearing and instead instituted
a judgment based on the unilateral assertions of WCF. The trial courts repeated
overruling of Argonaut's objections were a series of "misfortunes which prevented] the
presentation of a claim or defense"79 and this Court should reverse the trial court's

76

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

77

Id.

1%

Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, f 54, 150 P.3d 480.

19

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1953).
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rulings and require a hearing on damages.
II.

Whether the District Court was Incorrect not t^ Enter Judgment Against
Wadman Corporation who was the statutory employer as previously found
by the Supreme Court.
The district court erred in entering judgment only igainst Argonaut. This Court

found that Wadman was the statutory employer of Mr. Searle.80 Utah Code Ann. § 34A2-401(2) provides that responsibility to pay benefits is "on the employer and the
employer's insurance carrier."81 As the statutory employe^* of Mr. Searle, Wadman is
also liable for benefits due to Mr. Searle.
Utah courts have repeatedly found that statutory employers are liable for
compensation benefits. In BB & B Transportation v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 893
P.2d 611 (Utah App. 1995), the court found that a truckeij driver's employer and
statutory employer were both responsible for workers' compensation benefits.82 Also,
the court in Pinnacle Homes, Inc. v. Labor Commission, z007 UT App 368, 173 P.3d
208, found that a contractor (statutory employer) and subcontractor were liable to pay
the workers' compensation benefits due to a roofer that fell in the course of his
employment. In affirming the decision of the Appeals Board, the court stated that Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 "requires employers to provide \jvorkers' compensation benefits

°See Workers' Compensation Fund v. Wadman C^rp., 2009 UT 18, f33, 210 P.3d
277.
81

Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 34A-2-401(2)(a) (2002).

n

BB & B Transportation, 893 P.2d at 614.
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to employees injured in work-related accidents.'

Utah law requires that statutory

employers be liable for benefits to injured employees. The district court's failure to
include Mr. Searle's statutory employer Wadman on the judgment violates the Workers'
Compensation Act and the prior decisions of Utah courts.
III.

Whether the District Court Abused its discretion by failing to take evidence
on the status of the relationship between Argonaut and Wadman
The district court refused to allow Argonaut to present evidence of the contract

and the status of the relationship between Argonaut and Wadman. 84 This decision
prevented Argonaut from presenting issues to the district court that had not yet been
addressed in the litigation. The insurance contract between Argonaut and Wadman has
not been put into evidence in this case. That contract is the controlling document that
will determine what benefits Argonaut is required to pay on behalf of Wadman to its
statutory employee Mr. Searle. It is common knowledge that insurance contracts contain
provisions that may limit coverage of an insured. Argonaut, Wadman, and WCF must
have the opportunity to review this contract and have a court of competent jurisdiction
interpret its provisions. Not allowing the parties this opportunity is error.
WCF contends, and the trial court agreed, that all terms of the contract between
Wadman and Argonaut are contained in the OCIP Manuals in evidence, that all terms of
the OCIP Contract are set by statute, and that there are no more issues remaining before

**Pinnacle Homes, 2007 UT App 368 at %9.
84

R. 1451.
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the trial court.85 These assertions are incorrect. First, the OCIP Manual was prepared by
Willis86 and the representations of coverage in the manual were not made by Argonaut.
Thus, those representations cannot be binding on Argonaut.87 Also, the OCIP Manual
clearly states that it "[d]oes not and is not intended to provide coverage interpretations.
The terms and conditions of the policies alone govern how coverage is applied."88 The
policies that are now at issue in this case have never been put in evidence. To state that
all terms of the contract and policies have been before the court is false. As the OCIP
Manual states, the policy is controlling and must be interpreted by the court.
IV.

Whether the Labor Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
allowable benefits when they are in dispute and whether interest should be
charged and at what rate.
The district court erred when it entered judgment including damages because it

does not have jurisdiction to determine workers' compensation benefits. Also, the
interest rate charged by the court was in error because the Workers' Compensation Act
sets the rate of interest for workers' compensation benefits.

S5

Seee.g. R. 1355-1358 and R. 1451.

86

R. 579.

sl

See CityElec. v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983) ("It
is the principal who must cause third parties to believe thatti(ieagent is clothed with apparent
authority.") and Restatement (Second) of Agency § 7 (2007) (Only when principal has
manifested consent does agent have the power to affect the legal relations of the principal).
!

R. 581.
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A.

The Labor Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
workers' compensation benefits.

The district court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment that awarded workers'
compensation benefits. Only the Labor Commission has jurisdiction to determine
allowable benefits in workers' compensation cases. The district court even recognized
this in its judgment.89 The Workers' Compensation Act explicitly provides that
"[sjubject to appellate review under Section 34A-1-303, the commission has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine whether the treatment or services rendered to
employees by physicians, surgeons, or other health providers are: (i) reasonably related
to industrial injuries ... and (ii) compensable pursuant to this chapter ...."90 In addition,
the Workers' Compensation Act prohibits those seeking the collection or payment of
benefits from maintaining "a cause of action in any forum within this state other than the
commission"91 subject to a few exceptions that are not applicable in this case.
The district court in this case had no jurisdiction to determine the amount of
benefits payable to Mr. Searle. "District courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever over the

89

"Any dispute regarding the benefits provided pursuant to the Utah Workers
Compensation Act is the [sic] exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Utah Labor
Commission." R. 1481.
90

Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 34A-2-407(ll)(a) (2002). Mr. Searle was injured on
February 7, 2002 and the statute cited was the statute in effect at the time of his injury. The
current version of 34A-2-407(l l)(a) also gives the Labor Commission exclusive jurisdiction
to determine "the reasonableness of the amounts charged or paid" and "collection issues
related to a good or service."
91

Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 34A-2-407(l l)(b) (2002).
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determination of the amount of a compensation award or kn award of medical
benefits."92 The Workers' Compensation Act allows resort to a district court only if an
employee is injured by a willful or intentional tortious act or if an employer fails to
comply with the insurance requirements of the act.93 These exceptions are not applicable
and the district court erred when it entered an award against Argonaut for the workers'
compensation benefits of Mr. Searle.
In a prior appeal, this Court stated "[b]ecause Wadjnan's policy with Argonaut
was still valid and Mr. Searle was the statutory employee of Wadman, Argonaut must
pay Mr. Searle's compensation benefits."94 The district court, in violation of the
Workers' Compensation Act and Argonaut's due process rights, accepted WCF's
unilateral determination of Mr. Searle's compensation benefits and entered judgment
with damages against Argonaut. The Labor Commission has the exclusive jurisdiction to
determine Mr. Searle's compensation benefits and Argonaut has the right to present
evidence before the Labor Commission. Mr. Searle's proceeding before the Labor
Commission has been stayed pending resolution of this ca^e.95 The district court should
92

Stokes v. Flanders, 970 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1998). See also Sheppick v.
Albertson's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah 1996) ("District courts have no jurisdiction
whatsoever over cases that fall within the purview of the Wqrkers' Compensation Act") and
cases cited therein.
93

See Sheppick, 922 P.2d at 774 and Utah Code Annl 1953 §34A-2-207.

"Workers' Compensation Fund v. Wadman Corp., 2009 UT 18, |40, 210 P.3d277;
R.1313.
95

R. 709.
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have transferred the damages portion of the judgment to the Labor Commission for
determination instead of accepting the WCF's cursory assertions of the benefits due to
Mr. Searle. Argonaut must be able to present its case before the Labor Commission and
have the Labor Commission determine what medical expenses are related to the accident
and if those medical expenses were reasonable.
B.

The District Court erred when it awarded prejudgment interest as
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 and postjudgment interest as
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4.

The district court erred because the Workers' Compensation Act has its own
interest provisions that apply to this case so Utah Code Ann. §§ 15-1-1 and 15-1-4 are
inapplicable to this case.
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 only applies between parties to a
contract.

The district court awarded WCF $239,421.49 in prejudgment interest based on
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. However, this statute is inapplicable to this case. Utah Code
Ann. § 15-1-1 only applies to parties to a lawful contract. There is no contract between
Argonaut and WCF and so this statute does not apply. This Court in Wilcox v. Anchor
Wate, Co., 2007 UT 39, 164 P.3d 353 reversed a district court judge's award of interest
based on Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. The Court found that "[o]nly when the parties to a
contract fail to specify a rate of interest does the default rate specified in section 15-11(2) apply."96 The Court found the district court erred because there was no contract

Wilcox, 2007 UT 39, ^[44.
26

between the parties in Wilcox and that the appropriate rat^ of interest was that provided
by the statutes governing distribution of estates.97
Like the parties in Wilcox, there is no contract between Argonaut and WCF that
would trigger the applicability of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1^1. Also, as in Wilcox, this case
involves statutory provisions that provide an interest rate. The Workers' Compensation
Act provides that interest of 8% per annum is payable "from the date when each benefit
payment would have otherwise become due and payable.' 98 The district court's award of
pre-judgment interest relying on vague calculations based on unsupported claim
payment cash flows for calender years by WCF99 is in direct violation of this statute.
There is no contract between Argonaut and WCF to make Utah Code Ann. § 151-1 applicable to the judgment in this case. Pursuant to thd Workers' Compensation Act,
interest can only be applied from the date when each benefit was payable. This will
require the Labor Commission to determine what benefits are due to Mr. Searle and
when the benefits were and are payable. The district court erred in granting prejudgment
interest.

97

Id.

98

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(3) (2002).

"SeeR. 1517-1518.
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2.

The Workers' Compensation Act has its own interest provision
that is applicable to this case.

The post-judgment interest awarded by the district court is based on Utah Code
Ann. § 15-1-4. Like Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1, this provision is inapplicable to this case.
This statute applies to contracts and obligations in general.100 There is no contract
between Argonaut and WCF and Argonaut is to pay Mr. Searle's compensation benefits
not an obligation to WCF.101 This case involves the payment of workers' compensation
benefits and, as was established above, the Workers' Compensation Act and the Labor
Commission should govern the amount of payments in this case. Utah Code Ann. §151-4 is inapplicable and the interest rate set forth in the Workers' Compensation Act
governs.
Interest on workers' compensation benefits is governed by Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-420. This section provides that "[ajwards made by final order of the commission
shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date when each benefit
payment would have otherwise become due and payable."102 There has not been a final
award entered by the Labor Commission regarding benefits due to Mr. Searle and
therefore it was improper for the district court to enter a judgment with interest against
Argonaut at the rate of 10%. Interest should be awarded at the rate provided by the
m

See Utah Code Ann. § 15.

m

See Workers' Compensation Fund v.Wadman Corp,, 2009 UT 18, f40, 210 P.3d

277.
102

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(3).
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Workers' Compensation Act and only on a final order by |he Labor Commission.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reversb the district court's entry of
judgment and require a hearing on damages where evidence of the policy can be
presented or allow the Labor Commission to determine thp benefits due to Mr. Searle.

DATED this

7~

day of July, 2010.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN
& KANELL
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Theodore E. Kartell
Daniel E. Young
Attorneys for Appellants
Argonaut Insurance Company
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ORAL ARGUMENT
Argonaut requests oral argument be scheduled in this matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~7 day of July, 2010.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

leodore E. Kanell
Daniel E. Young
Attorneys for Appellants
Argonaut Insurance Company
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day of July, 2010, a true and correct copy of
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY was mailed,
postage prepaid to the following:

James R. Black
James R. Black & Associates
265 E. 100 S., Ste 255
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Dennis V. Lloyd
Workers Compensation Fund
100 West Towne Ridge Parkway
Sandy, UT 84070
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ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure R^ile 24(a)(l 1)(A)-(C), Argonaut
attaches as "Exhibit A" the district court's judgment on remand and as "Exhibit B" this
Court's prior decision in this case.
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EXHIBIT A
Judgment on Remand
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PRELIMINARY
1.

This matter is subject to a Remand Order from the Utah Supreme Court dated

March 24, 2009.
2.

Workers Compensation Fund and Iverson Steel (jointly referred to as "WCF")

filed its First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief1 dated September 30, 2002. Among
other claims for relief, WCF asked the district court for the following declaratory and other relief
from defendant Argonaut Insurance ("Argonaut"): (1) A declaratory judgment that Argonaut is
the insurance carrier liable to pay workers compensation benefits to and on behalf of statutory
employee Corey Searle, an Iverson Steel employee who was injured in an accident arising out of
and in the course of his OCIP employment for statutory employer Wadman Corporation; (2) that
Argonaut is to reimburse WCF all workers' compensation benefits it advanced on behalf of
Corey Searle; (3) that Argonaut is to reimburse WCF administrative costs incurred in adjusting
the Corey Searle workers' compensation claim; (4) that Argonaut be assessed interest as allowed
by Utah law; and (5) that Argonaut pay WCF the costs of court incurred in pursuing the claim
against Argonaut2.
4.

After discovery was completed, the parties filed cross motions for summary

judgment. The district court granted the defendants' motions and denied WCF's. WCF
appealed.
5.

Prior to the appeal, WCF stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice of defendant

*See Declaratory Judgments Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-401 et seq. and Rule 57 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
2

See "First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Other Relief as Attachment 1

hereto.
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Willis.3
6.

Prior to an appellate court ordered mediation, defendant Wadman assigned its

rights to WCF.4
7.

Prior to oral argument before the Utah Supreme |Court, WCF stipulated to the

dismissal with prejudice of its claims against the School Distrid and the State of Utah
defendants. WCF's remaining claim on appeal was that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to Argonaut.5
8.

The Supreme Court reversed the Third District Court's decision granting

defendant Argonaut's motion for summary judgment in its opinion dated March 24,2009. It
ordered the case remanded "...for action consistent with... (the) opinion".6
9.

Argonaut filed a Petition for Rehearing April 7, 2009. Per Supreme Court request

WCF filed a responsive brief May 19, 2009. The Supreme Coup denied Argonaut's rehearing
petition June 24, 2009.
JUDGMENT
The Court, having reviewed the Utah Supreme Court opntuon in this matter and the
associated remand order, hereby adopts that opinion in its entirety and specifically enters
judgment as requested by WCF that:

3

Workers Compensation Fund v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 2009 |UT 18; 626 Utah Adv. Rep. 18;
Utah Lexis 54 (Utah 2009). See the Supreme Court opinion h\ its entirety as Attachment 2.
4

See, Id. at ^|6, Attachment 2.

5

See, Id., Attachment 2.

6

See, Id. at f41, Attachment 2.
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1.

Defendant Wadman, general contractor of the Owner Controlled Insurance

Program ("OCIP") project, was at all relevant times the statutory employer7 of Iverson Steel and
its OCIP site injured employee Corey Searle8;
2.

Because Wadman ys policy with Argonaut was still valid and Mr. Searle was the

statutory employee of Wadman, Argonaut must pay Mr. Searle fs compensation benefits9;
3.

Argonaut shall reimburse WCF all workers' compensation benefits it advanced

on behalf of Corey Searle and will immediately assume its role as the liable workers
compensation carrier for the Corey Searle claim at issue.
To August 10, 2009, WCF is entitled to reimbursement of $490,063.10 it has paid to or
on behalf of Corey Searle10.
Any dispute regarding the benefits provided pursuant to the Utah Workers Compensation
Act is the exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Utah Labor Commission11;
4.

Argonaut shall reimburse WCF reasonable administrative costs incurred in

adjusting the Corey Searle workers' compensation claim which totals $7,000;
5.

Argonaut shall pay prejudgment interest on all workers' compensation benefits it

advanced on behalf of Corey Searle and reasonable administrative costs incurred in adjusting the

7

See, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-103(7)(a)(ii).

8

See, Argonaut at ^[f 39 and 40, Attachment 2.

9

See, Id. at f40, Attachment 2.

10

See the Claim Reserves Summary as Attachment 3.

n

See, Working RX, Inc. V. Workers Compensation Fund, 2007 UT App 376; 173 P.3d
853. Stokes v. Flanders, 970 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1998).
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Corey Searle workers5 compensation claim as provided in Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1 at 10% per
annum to the date of entry of this Judgment. The prejudgment (interest as of August 10, 2009,
totals $293,421.4912.
6.

After entry this Judgment and until the Judgment is satisfied, Argonaut shall pay

post judgment interest on all amounts herein ordered as provided by Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4.
7.

The judgment totals as follows:
Workers Compensation Benefits paid to August 110, 2009
Administrative Costs to August 10, 2009
Prejudgment Interest Per Utah Code Ann. §15-Ul
Total Judgment

Dated this 21 day o

$490,063.1013
$ 7,000.00
$293,421.49"
$790484.59

2010

DISTRICT COUKOUDOfi^^

2

See, Attachment 4 with explanation of calculations and ^spreadsheet of prejudgment

interest.
13

See the Claim Reserves summary as Attachment 3.

14

To August 10, 2009. See, Attachment 4 with explanation of calculations and
spreadsheet of prejudgment interest.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of December 2009,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Revised Per Minute Entry Dated December 11, 2009)
to be DELIVERED to the following:

Theodore E. Kanell
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, PC
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Page 6 of 6

EXHIBIT B
WCF v. Wadman, 2009 UT 1$, 210 P.3d 277

Westtsw
Page 1
210 P 3d 277, 626 Utah Adv Rep 18, 2009 UT 18
(Cite as: 210 P.3d 277)

H
Supreme Court of Utah
WORKERS* COMPENSATION FUND and Iverson Steel and ErectioJi Company, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v
WADMAN CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant,
v
State of Utah Depaitment of Administrative Services, Division of Risk Management, Argonaut Insuiance Co , and
Washington County School District, Defendants ^nd Appellee
Nos. 20070160, 20070180.
March 24, 2009
Rehearing Denied June 24, 2009
Background: Workers' Compensation Fund (WCF) brought action aganist general contractor and its Workers'
Compensation insurer after coverage was denied to employee of subcontractor injured on project overseen by general
contractor The District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County, Saruha N ffeulei, J , gi anted summary judgment to
msurei, and WCF appealed
Holdings: The Supreme Comt, Nehnng, J , held that
11) insurer was not bound by acts of general contractor which had agreed to have subconti actor's employees covered,
{2j employees of subcontractor were not covered as "loaned employees" of general contractor,
(">) manual of Owner Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP) did not mandate that OCPI must automatically supply
insurance to all subcontractor,
ij-) injured employee of subcontractor was not coveied as employee of subconti actor,
(5) insurer did not have responsibility to verify that subcontractors were properly enrolled, and
H>) general contractor was statutory employer of subcontractor and its employees were coveied by contractor's coveiage
Reversed
West Headnotes
ill Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 1 1
413 Workers' Compensation
4 P I Nature and Grounds of Employer's Liability
413k 11 k Purpose of Legislation Most Cited Cases
The purpose of the Workeis' Compensation Act is to provide compensation! to injured employees by a simple and
speedy piocedure which eliminates the expense, delay and uncertainty in proving fault West's L C A ^ 4 \ 2 101 to

JH Workers' Compensation 413 €^>1061
413 Woikers' Compensation
4 n \ I Insurance and Public Funds

©2010 Thomson Reuters No Claim to Oiig US CJov Works

Page 2
210 P.3d 277, 626 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2009 UT 18
(Cite as: 210 P.3d 277)
413X1{D) Private Insurance
413k1061 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
When a dispute arises regarding workers' compensation insurance, inferences constituting a worker's right to recover
are liberally construed in favor of the employee. West's U.C.A. § 34A-2-101 to § 34A-11-102.
]31 Workers' Compensation 413 €^>1061
443 Workers' Compensation
413X1 Insurance and Public Funds
\\3XhD} Private Insurance
413k1Q6l k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Workers' Compensation insurer was not bound by acts of general contractor, which had agreed to have subcontractor's
employees covered but then neglected to send enrollment form to insurer's broker, although contractor may have acted
as if it had authority to complete the enrollment process; insurer had not contributed to formation of a belief that
contractor was its agent or knowingly permitted it to assume the exercise of such authority and, to contrary, contractor
had agreement with broker to act as its agent to receive insurance enrollment forms.
HI Principal and Agent 308 € ^ 9 9
}08 Principal and Agent
3081 fl Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
30SIIKA) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
20Sk99 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
It is only when consent to the exercise of authority by a presumptive agent has been manifested by the principal that
the agent has the power to affect the legal relations of the principal. RcstaicmentJ Second] of A^ene\ _§.7{51 Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 1 0 6 5
413 Workers' Compensation
4 {3X4 Insurance and Public Funds
iLlXLlPJ Private Insurance
413kJ 064 Risks and Coverage
4JL3kJ06S k. In General. Mo&t Cited Cases
Employees of a subcontractor which was inadvertently left out of applications for Workers' Compensation coverage
were not covered as "loaned employees" of general contractor under alternate employer endorsement of general
contractor's policy with insurer; subcontractor's employees were not on contractor's payroll or meant to continue
working for contractor after the project was completed, and subcontractor had contracted with contractor as a company to perform work, not contracted as employees.
J61 Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 1 0 6 1
413 Workers' Compensation
4J3X1 Insurance and Public Funds
413X1(D) Private Insurance
413kl06l k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Manual of Owner Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP) did not mandate that "OOP team" of the state, its engineer,
and all applicable insurance carriers or state agency representatives working to implement the insurance program must
automatically supply insurance to all subcontractors, such that a subcontractor would be covered despite general
contractor's neglect to send form to insurer's broker; manual instead required that subcontractors and contractors must
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submit enrollment forms and obtain separate insurance contracts.
121 Insurance 217 €^>2094
21.7 Insurance
217XV Coverage—in General
217k2094 k. Commencement of Coverage. Most Cited Cases
When determining the starting date of an insurance contract, the law looks to| the contract terms.
18] Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 1 0 6 5
413 Workers' Compensation
413X1 Insurance and Public Funds
413X1(1)) Private Insurance
413k 1064 Risks and Coverage
413kl065 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Injured employee of subcontractor on public project, for whom general contractor neglected to send Workers' Compensation enrollment form to insurer's broker, was not covered by insurer as employee of subcontractor; Owner
Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP) manual plainly stated that the form mijst be submitted as part of the enrollment
process, and the insurance company never issued a binding receipt.
121 Workers' Compensation 413 € ^ 1 0 6 1
413 Workers' Compensation
413X1 Insurance and Public Funds
43 3XI(D) Private Insurance
413k 1061 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Workers' Compensation insurer on a public construction project did not halve responsibility to verify that subcontractors were properly enrolled for Workers' Compensation coverage as part of its contract with the Owner Controlled
Insurance Program (OCIP); duty of OCIP team members was to oversee safety, not relieve contractors of responsibility, and OCIP manual specified that general contractor itself had responsibility to ensure that subcontractors were
enrolled. West's U.C.A. § 34A-2-201.
[10] Workers' Compensation 413 €^>351
4JL3 Workers' Compensation
413 V Employees Within Acts
413V(G) Employees of Contractor or Subcontractor
413k351 k. Liability of General Contractor to Employees of Subcontractor. Most Cited Cases
General contractor on public construction project was statutory employer, under Workers' Compensation statutes, of
subcontractor and its employees for whom general contractor had neglected to file form for Workers' Compensation
coverage, and thus employees were covered by contractor's insurance; contractor hired subcontractor to complete steel
work and therefore procured its services, contractor exercised control by supervising subcontractor's work, and contractor's trade and business was construction, so that erecting steel in the building was part of that trade and business.
West's U.C.A. §34A-2-103(2).
1111 Workers' Compensation 413 ^ ^ 3 ^
413 Workers' Compensation
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4J 1X_ Employees Within Acts
^ LlYlLll Employees of Contractor or Subcontractor
41 ">kJ44 k In General Most C ited Cases
Typically, an employee seeking Workers' Compensation coverage for an injury cannot reach through the layers of
employers any further than the first-msured contractor West's I ' C A § 34A-2-1 (J3.(7)(e)
*279 James R Black, Dennis V Lloyd, Salt Lake City, for appellant Workers' Compensation Fund
iheodoie F Kanell, Russell \\ Haitvigsen, Salt Lake City, for appellee
NLHRIN< i. Justice
INTRODUCTION
Tf 1 In this appeal, we determine who was responsible foi paying workers' compensation benefits to Corey Searle, an
employee of Iverson Steel and Erection Company, who was injured while working on the Santa Clara Middle School
m Santa Clara, Utah Iverson had a subcontract with Wadman Corporation to peiform the steel erection component of
the construction of the Santa Clara Middle School, Wadman was the entity retained by the Washington County School
District to be the general contractor on the project Argonaut Insurance Company provided the workers' compensation
coverage for the project through an Owner-Controlled Insurance Program, which we will refer to as the OCIP After
Mr Searle was injured, Argonaut refused to pay his claims The Workers' Compensation Fund x l then sued the
Washington County School District, the State of Utah Department of Administrative Services, Division of Risk
Management, Willis of Utah, Inc , Wadman, and Argonaut The WCF stipulated to a dismissal of its claim against
Willis The School District, the Division of Risk Management, and Argonaut successfully moved for summary
judgment The WCF appealed It claims that the district court erred when it concluded that the defendants were not
responsible for providing coverage to Iverson that covered Mr Seaile After the appeal was filed but before oral
argument, the WCF settled with the School District and the Division of Risk Management, leaving only the WCF's
claim against Argonaut to be decided As we conclude that Mr Searle was Wadman's statutory employee, we reveise
1_N_L Iverson was initially a plaintiff in this case, but it subsequently assigned its rights to the WCF

BACKGROUND
% 2 While working on the Middle School project for the School Distuct, Mr Seaile seveiely injured both legs when he
fell two stones and landed on concrete Insurance coveiage foi the Middle School pioject was controlled by the OCIP,
which was initially created by the Division of Risk Management After the OOP's creation, each school district withm
Utah had the option of participating m the OCIP to help reduce construction costs The School District chose to participate in the OCIP for the Middle School project Argonaut was the designated workers' compensation insurance
carrier for all contractois and subcontractors who enrolled m the OCIP As part of its contract with the School District,
Wadman agreed to purchase workers' compensation insurance through the *280 OCIP Wadman also agreed to be
responsible for ensuring that all subcontractors were enrolled with the OCIP carrier, Argonaut
K 3 Although Wadman initially verified that all subcontractors were properly enrolled in the OCIP, the steel erection
subcontractor originally retained by Wadman fell behind schedule and Wadman replaced it with a new subcontractor,
Iverson, to complete the steel erection work Wadman rejected Iverson's initial bid for the work, but an agreement was
reached after Iverson reduced its price to pass through to Wadman the savings in workeis' compensation piemiums
that Iverson would realize because of the OCIP After Iverson agreed to the contract, Wadman trained Iverson in the
safety practices required by the OCIP, but it failed to send the OCIP enrollment form for Iverson to Willis, the msuiance broker that was assigned to be the OCIP administrator Iverson began working on the project on January 28,
2002, and Argonaut began receiving insurance premiums for the job The WCF, Iverson's alternate insurance provider,
did not receive premiums foi the Middle School project Argonaut's Senior Safety Management Consultant, J Le-
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manski, later inspected the construction site for safety, but he did not comment on Iverson's enrollment status On
February 7, 2002, Mr Searle was mjured The following day, Wadman submitted the enrollment form for Iverson to
Willis Argonaut later issued Iverson an insurance policy, but the effective date of the policy was February 8, the day
after the accident
^ 4 Iverson submitted a claim for Mr Searle's injury to Argonaut, which Argonaut denied Argonaut based its denial
on the fact that the enrollment form was not submitted until the day after Mr Searle's accident The WCF then sued
Argonaut, the Division of Risk Management, the School District, Willis, and Wadman The defendants moved to
dismiss First, they contended that the WCF did not have standing to bring its claim because it was not injured The
WCF successfully overcame the challenge to its standing by noting that it had obtained an assignment of rights from
Iverson and had paid Mr Searle's claim
f 5 Following discovery, the WCF stipulated to a dismissal of its claims agaWt Willis The School District and the
Division of Risk Management moved for summary judgment They asserted that they could not be considered the
employers or insurers of Iverson because no contractual obligation existed that required them to pay workers' compensation Argonaut also moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did jnot have a responsibility to provide insurance for Mr Searle because Wadman did not have agency authority to act for Argonaut, Iverson's employees were
not loaned, the enrollment form foi Iverson was not submitted until after the accident, and Wadman was not the statutory employer of Mr Searle Wadman opposed the other defendants' motions for summary judgment and amended
its answer to include cross-claims against Argonaut, the School District, and the Division of Risk Management The
district court held a hearing on all the motions before it and granted summary judgment m favor of the School District,
the Division of Risk Management, and Argonaut It also held that the grant of summary judgment to those defendants
made Wadman's cross-claims moot
U 6 The WCF appealed Wadman filed a separate appeal The cases were assigned together for mediation On September 7, 2007, prior to the mediation, Wadman assigned its rights to the WCF Mediation between the WCF, the
School District, the Department of Risk Management, and Argonaut was not successful A briefing schedule was set,
and the WCF timely filed a brief in which it advanced the claims of Iverson and Wadman that had been assigned to it
The WCF argued that the district court's grant of summary judgment to Argonaut, the School District, and the Division
of Risk Management was in error Prior to oral argument, the WCF stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of its
claims against the School District and the Division of Risk Management The WCF's only remaining claim on appeal
is, therefoie, that the district court erred m granting summary judgment to Argonaut The WCF advances the following
arguments foi requiring Argonaut to provide coverage for Mr Searle's accident (1) Wadman was Argonaut's agent
and bound Aigonaut*281 to provide coverage, (2) Iverson's employees were loaned employees and were covered by
the Alternate Employer Endorsement of the Argonaut Policy, (3) Argonaut must provide coverage because the Middle
School was an OCIP pioject and Argonaut was an OCIP insurer, and (4) Argonaut must provide coverage because
Wadman was the statutory employer of Mr Searle and because Argonaut wasj bound to cover workers' compensation
claims against Wadman
STANDARD O F REVIEW
f 7 In order for summary judgment to be granted, there must be no issue of material fact and the moving party must be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law ! tah R Ci\ P So(c), Bouen \ RnatbnLm
6S6P 2d 4^4 4 ^ <[ lah 1982)
The essential facts of the case legardmg the terms and manner of Mr Searle's employment are undisputed As a result,
the responsibility of Argonaut to pay compensation for Mr Searle's accident is an issue of law that we will decide
Bennett \ Indus ( omm n "26 P 2d 42?. 429 (Utah 1986), lUmc heath Sdf\\d\ bred Pwih hit 304 Md 6~\ 49^
\ 2d 803, 806 (1%^) The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to t rlah C ode section "8 VMQ2(3)(j) and
gives no deference to the district court's conclusions of law, Kianlz i Holt, 819 P 2d 352 "^3 (I lah 1991)
ANALYSIS
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[l][2j ^ 8 The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to provide compensation to injured employees "by a
simple and speedy procedure which eliminates the expense, delay and uncertainty" in proving fault. IVi I steady Indus,
Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 214, 4Q7 P,2d 692, 693 (1965); see Shupe v Wasatth Elee. Co . 546 P.2d 896. 900 fl tali 1976)
(Maughan, J., dissenting). When a dispute arises regarding workers' compensation insurance, "inferences ... constituting a worker's right to recover are liberally construed" in favor of the employee. Baker v. Indus Comm'n. 17 Utah
Z&JA L 405 P.2d6l3. 614 (Utah 1965). The WCF argues that various doctrines have been created to afford employees
compensation and to prevent employers from avoiding responsibility. Specifically, it argues that Argonaut should
have been required to provide coverage based on the theory of agency authority, the loaned employee doctrine, the
requirement that insurance contracts be interpreted in favor of the employee, and the statutory employer doctrine. We
will discuss each of these theories in turn, concluding that despite shortcomings of the first three, Mr. Searle was the
statutory employee of Wadman and therefore covered by its compensation earner, Argonaut.
I. WADMAN DID NOT HAVE AGENCY AUTHORITY TO ACT FOR ARGONAUT
[3J H 9 The WCF claims that Wadman acted as Argonaut's agent, which obligated Argonaut to provide insurance. The
argument presented is that a principal, Argonaut, is bound by the acts of an agent who has apparent authority to act.
The WCF and Iverson contend that since Wadman acted as if it had authority to complete the workers' compensation
enrollment process, Argonaut was bound by Wadman's actions. See Restatement (Second) of Xgency § 8 (1958);
Vickenx. N._±m Land Devs , lnc . 94 N.M. 65, 607 P.2d 603, 604 (1980).
[4] \10 We indicated in Litddmgton v Bodenvest, Ltd that in order to cloak a presumptive agent with authority, " 'the
principal [must have] manifested his ... consent to the exercise of such authority or [have] knowingly permitted the
agent to assume the exercise of such authority.' " 855 P.2d 204, 209 (Utah 1993) (quoting Am.iur.2d Agency $ 80
(1986)). We also stated that "[i]t is the principal who must cause third parties to believe that the agent is clothed with
apparent authority." (7/v Elei, v Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth. (C>2 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 198^). It is only when this
consent has been manifested by the principal that the agent has "the power to affect the legal relations of the principal."
fe^tateme\\\ (Second) of Agency § 7 (2007).
TJ 11 The WCF and Iverson argue that Wadman's actions imply that agency authority existed. The record, however,
contains no evidence that Argonaut contributed to the *282 formation of a belief that Wadman was Argonaut's agent
or that Argonaut knowingly permitted Wadman to "assume the exercise of such authority." Lunjljiigion „85_5_P2d_ai
209. Argonaut contracted with Willis to act as its agent, with the authority to receive all enrollment forms and issue
safety manuals. The limit of Wadman's workers' compensation responsibility was to verify that subcontractors were
properly enrolled in the OCIP as required by Wadman's contract with the School District.
K 12 If Iverson believed that an agency relationship existed between Wadman and Argonaut, it was Iverson's responsibility to verify that Argonaut had conferred this authority on Wadman. lions hirst Aat'l Bank v Clark Clam
Ci}I'lhj.2:ilZJLld iPlU,.109_5.xU.iah 1988) (holding that "one who deals exclusively with an agent has the responsibility
to ascertain that agent's authority despite the agent's representations"). Since Iverson did not verify that Wadman had
agency authority and since Argonaut never stated that such an authority existed, Wadman could not have acted to bind
Argonaut as Iverson's workers' compensation insurer.
II. IVERSON'S EMPLOYEES WERE NOT "LOANED" EMPLOYEES
[5J K 13 The WCF also contends that Iverson's employees were "loaned" to Iverson by Wadman and consequently
were covered by the Alternate Employer Endorsement of Argonaut's workers' compensation policy with Wadman
The WCF failed to state what was meant by a "loaned employee" in its brief and did not explain or include the full text
or background of the Alternate Employer Endorsement. Consequently, the substance of its argument is unclear. We
assume, however, that the WCF was referring to the rule set forth in 07/crs? v Salazar, 883 P.2d 1352, 1356-5 7 (Utah
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1994) Ghei si indicates that an employee is loaned if " '( a ) the employee [has made a contract of hire, express or
implied, with the special employer, (b) the work being done is essentially that of the special employer, and (c) the
special employer has the right to control the details of the work ' " Id_ (quoting IB Arthur Larson, Workmen's Com
pensation Law § 48 00, at 8-343 (1992)) The loaned employee doctrine typically applies when a temporary agency or
general employer hires employees, placing them on company payroll, and then loans the employees to other "special"
employers to actually perform work Id
U 14 The WCF's argument regarding how Iverson's employees were loaned is ambiguous The WCF does claim,
however, that Iverson was Wadman's special or alternate employer and should therefore receive compensation from
Wadman's insurance provider, Argonaut It appears that the WCF contends thit Wadman hired Iverson's employees as
the "general employer" and then loaned the employees back to Iverson as the temporary or "special employer," which
obligated Argonaut, as Wadman's insurance provider, to supply coverage und^r the Alternate Employer Endorsement
H 15 The loaned employee doctrine presupposes that workers are "under contract to the [general labor] service to work
as an employee for a client" and that the general employer, which is typically the temporary agency but m this instance
would be Wadman, is merely loaning the employees and not supervising the actual work Ghctw ^1_P 2dju jJW) ">"
see also llj }(hL Wotoiola, hie B D \ri7 M 7 , 662 P 2d 1024 1025 (1983) Mere Iverson's employees did not have a
i ontract with Wadman and no evidence was presented that Iverson's employees were on Wadman's payroll or would
continue working for Wadman after the project was complete The inclusion of employees on the company payroll and
their continued employment with the general employer after the completion of the project are key factors m determining if an employee is loaned See Ghasi, 88^ P 2d at 13^6 S"7 Iverson contracted with Wadman as a company to
perform work on the project Since no contract existed between Wadman and the employees, as evidenced by the fact
that the employees were not directly paid by Wadman, Wadman could not have loaned the employees to other entities
Furthermore, Wadman was responsible for supervising Iverson's work, so a lpaned-employee relationship could not
have existed
*283 11 16 The alternate argument that Iverson loaned its employees to Wadman as the special employer also does not
apply m this case A central test m determining if a labor service loaned its employee is if it "was not responsible for
performance of the construction work " Wotd 662 P 2d at 102** (emphasis added) Iverson was responsible for the
steel construction work, therefore, it did more than furnish laborers Because Iverson provided laboreis, contracted to
erect the steel on the project, and took responsibility for the performance of the steel work, it could not have loaned its
employees to Wadman Since no evidence was presented that Argonaut had a contract with Iverson to piovide
workers' compensation coverage for its loaned employees, the designation of Ivjerson's employees as "loaned"-and it is
clear that they were not "loaned"-is of no legal consequence
III NO CONTRACT WAS CREATED BETWEEN IVERSON AND ARGCJNAUT IN THE ABSENCE OF THE
COMPLETED ENROLLMENT FORM
1) 17 The WCF argues that a contract of insurance was formed between Argonaiit and the state to provide coverage for
I\ erson since Aigonaut was part of the " O O P team" and was required to provide insurance to all subcontractors The
WCF fuithei contends that the failure to submit the emollment form was immaterial to the formation of a contract of
msuiance between Iverson and Argonaut and therefore the contract should be enforced
H 18 The notion that an implied contract existed between Argonaut and other participants m the OCIP team that required Argonaut to provide insurance to all subcontractors is not supported by the terms found m the OCIP manual
The OCIP manual supplemented the individual insurance policies issued to contractors and subcontractors and set
forth the terms of the OCIP The manual states that it "identifies, defines, andl assigns responsibilities lelated to the
administration of the [OCIP] " It also "[describes the OCIP and details the insurance-related responsibilities of the
various parties involved," however, it "is not intended to piovide coverage interpretations" and the "terms and con
ditions of the policies alone govern how coverage is applied "
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U 19 Although the policy alone determines coverage, the OCIP manual was nevertheless an essential element m defining the contractual relationships that existed between the OCIP team members The manual specifies that its terms
are binding and "[t]he requirements of the [OCIP] Manual, including State of Utah OCIP Safety and Health Manual,
shall become a part of [the] Contract Agreement" It also states that any "Contractor/Subcontractor shall cause all
provisions and requirements of the OCIP to be included m any contract/subcontract agreement
and shall assure
compliance "
[6J H 20 As a binding agreement defining the contractual obligation among its parties, the OCIP manual mentions the
existence of an "OCIP team," but does not require that the team supply insurance to all subcontractors The safety
manual defines the OCIP team as "the Owner (STATE OF UTAH/ENGINEER), WILLIS CORROON and all applicable insurance carriers or the representative of defmed State agencies and firms working together to implement the
insurance progiam " The manual specifies that the owner's responsibility consists of providing general support for the
worksite The OCIP manual specifically contemplates the possibility that a contractor may choose not to enroll with
the OCIP insurance provider The manual specifies that "[non-enrolled] contractors should notify their own insurance
company" instead of the OCIP insurance of mjunes The OCIP manual also repeatedly states that although all subcontractors should enroll m OCIP, coverage is only valid for properly enrolled subcontractors, stating that '[t]he OCIP
will be only for the benefit of Contractor/Subcontractor(s) of all tiers who have been properly enrolled m the OCIP
progiam " In order to be properly enrolled, the manual specifies that all contractors/subcontractors are required to
submit enrollment forms and complete certain requirements Each subcontractor also received a separate contract of
insurance The necessity of each subcontractor obtaining a separate contract of insurance and eniollmg separately *2 84
in the OCIP indicates no general contract of insurance existed between Argonaut and all subcontractors
J\ % 21 In the absence of a contract being formed by the existence of the OCIP, the question remains if a contract was
otherwise created between Iverson and Argonaut When determining the starting date of an insurance contract, the law
looks to the contract terms Ustm Wjongfige, lnc__ \SuhL *w Tuk Ins Jo
2006 I 1 F B4 *1 K 139 P 3d 10*b ("An
msmance policy is merely a contract between the insured and the insurer and is construed pursuant to the same rules
applied to ordinary contiacts " (internal quotation maiks omitted))
11 22 The Argonaut enrollment expressly states that before any contractors or subcontiactors start woik on the project,
Willis must leceive the form The OCIP manual confirms this requirement and indicates that although u [t]he 'Start
Date' indicated on the contract award form is the date that the Contractor/Subcontractor is expected to begin operations at the Project Site," all subcontractors aie to be properly enrolled before access to the project site is allowed and
coveiage begins
U 23 The WCF argues that the form was not an essential element of the contract It cites testimony from Argonaut's
vice president from a different case m which he opined that if the State of Utah lolling wrap-up pieces were all m
place, Argonaut would provide coveiage even without the form This statement, however, does not mean that the
enrollment form, despite being expressly made a part of the insurance contract, is superfluous Rather, the testimony
illustiates that m one instance, an Argonaut executive speculated that the form may not have been necessary In contrast to that statement, the OCIP manual repeatedly states that submitting the form is required to complete OCIP
enrollment and that the form must be received by Willis before any subcontractors can start work The form is necessary because it allows the insurance agent to track applications for enrollment and obtain necessary information for
setting insurance rates
U 24 The WCF maintains that Wadman's payment of a premium for Iverson's coverage to Argonaut and not the WCF
demonstiates that the form was a mere technicality and that a contract of insurance already existed between Argonaut
and Iverson The WCF and Iveison fail to cite any case law supporting this assertion Several states, including Utah,
have tieated as enforceable "binder" agreements between an msmance piovider and an insured that provide tempoiary
msmance befoie the actual policy is issued See Williams \ hu\t Colony Lih ln\ C o , *>93 P 2d s 34 ([ tali 19^9)
These binder agreements, however, typically require an application to be submitted and the insurer to provide a con-
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ditional receipt specifying the terms of the binder. Cain v Aetna Life ins. Co 135 Kin. 189._659_P2<1J3341!%31;
Spimea * -Mistare Life In,. Co. of \ ) , 94 N.Y.2d 645, 710 N.V.~S.2d 29$. T3I N.h.2d 1106 (2000). The binder
agreements also require, according to the Fifth Circuit, that all conditions specified by the insurance provider be met,
Giadnex v Pau( Revere Life Ins. ( o , 895 F,2d 238 (5th Cu. 1990), "in order for a contract of temporary insurance to
exist" ~Fox\] Catholic KJiights Im Soc'y, 2003 Wi 87, <[ 23, 263 Wis.2d 2(37 665 N.W.2d 181 (2003) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Although premiums were paid to Argonaut, none of the other requirements for a
binder agreement were met.
^[25 We previously stated that although "it is unfair for an insurer to collect a premium which purports to cover a
period when in fact no such coverage exists: i.e., between the time of the application and the delivery of the policy," it
is for
this reason, we have approved the rule that ordinarily, when the insured has done everything required of him and
paid his premium, the insurance takes effect from the time of the issuance of a binding receipt, even though the
policy has not been delivered. This is especially so when death or injury ocjeurs from some cause unrelated to any
possible ground for rejecting the application.
Williams, 593 P 2d at :
[8J % 26 In this case, the application or enrollment form was never received by Argonaut*285 and the insurance
company never issued a binding receipt. Argonaut clearly stated that receipt of the enrollment form was a prerequisite
to coverage. Since Iverson was required to submit the form and no binding receipt was given, no contract was created.
The terms of the OCIP manual were clear. The manual plainly stated that the| form must be submitted as part of the
enrollment process.
[9J % 27 The WCF alternately argues that Argonaut was required to provide coverage since it had a responsibility to
verify that all subcontractors were properly enrolled as part of its contract with the OCIP. It contends that J. Lemanski,
Argonaut's Senior Safety Management Consultant, was on the job inspecting the premises for safety before the accident, had knowledge of Iverson's involvement, and had a responsibility to vepfy that those working on the site were
insured as part of the safety inspections.
^[ 28 Evaluating the safety of a job site is not the same as verifying that a subcontractor has met all of the conditions
necessary to commence insurance coverage. The OCIP Safety and Health Marjual states, "Each Contractor shall bear
sole and exclusive responsibility for safety in all phases of their work. Nothing contained herein shall relieve such
responsibility." It also states that the role of OCIP team members includes the 'overall management responsibility for
site safety and health," but "[tjhis responsibility does not supersede, override! or take precedence over that of Contractors who are ultimately responsible for the safety and health of their employees...." The duty of OCIP team
members was to oversee safety, not to relieve contractors of responsibility. There is nothing m the OCIP manual that
indicates Argonaut contracted with the Division of Risk Management to be responsible for ensuring that all subcontractors were properly enrolled. In contrast, the OCIP manual clearly specifies that Wadman had a lesponsibility to
ensure that all subcontractors were properly enrolled, and pursuant to \ hah Code section 34A-2-201, Iverson also had
the responsibility of making sure that its employees were insured, which it failed to do. Although Argonaut may have
had a responsibility to conduct safety inspections, verification that Iverson was properly enrolled was beyond the
scope of Argonaut's responsibility.
IV. MR. SEARLE WAS A STATUTORY EMPLOYEE|OF WADMAN
Tl 29 In response to motions for summary judgment in the district court, the pjlaintiffs contended that Argonaut and
Wadman were Mr. Searle's statutory employers for purposes of workers' compensation coverage. The WCF reiterates
those arguments here, urging us to find that under the OCIP "common law employee/employer relationships are
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altered" and the key element in determining a statutory relationship is the right to control.
^ 30 Argonaut asserts that the statutory employer argument should be dismissed because the argument is a claim that
could only be brought by Wadman and because Wadman failed to file an appellate brief. It is true that Wadman did not
file an appellate brief; Wadman, however, assigned its rights to the WCF prior to the mediation and before a briefing
schedule was set. Accordingly, the WCF had the right to bring a claim directly against Argonaut for coverage based on
any claim that Wadman had. The WCF did so on February 7, 2008, when it filed its opening brief in which it asserted
that Wadman was Mr. Searle's statutory employer and coverage should be provided by Argonaut. Argonaut also
argues that the brief filed by the WCF does not raise any of Wadman's claims. Although the WCF's brief does not
discuss the elements of the statutory employer doctrine in great detail, it does claim that Wadman was the statutory
employer of Iverson, which was sufficient to put Argonaut on notice of the statutory employer argument. Since
Wadman assigned its rights to the WCF and since the joint brief raised Wadman's claims, the WCF's statutory employer claim should not be dismissed.
[10] % 31 Ltah Code section 34A-2-103(2) defines the circumstances under which an employer/employee relationship
is created as a matter of law. This section states that an employer is someone "who regularly employs *286 one or
more workers or operatives in the same business, or in or about the same establishment." Utah Code \nn. §
34 A-2-103(2) (Supp. 2008) IX2. Section 34A-2-103(7)(a)(ii), the statutory employee section, also indicates that if
FN2. The legislature amended Title 34 in 2008. Because the changes do not affect our analysis, we cite to the
2008 version.
an employer procures any work to be done wholly or m part for the employer by a contractor over whose work the
employer retains supervision or control, and this work is apart or process in the trade or business of the employer,
the contractor, all persons employed by the contractor, all subcontractors under the contractor, and all persons
employed by any of these subcontractors, are considered employees of the original employer for the purposes of this
chapter.
LtaM qd_e Ann fr 34A-2-103(7)(a)(ii) (emphasis added). In Bennett v Industrial Commission, we clarified that the
term "supervision or control" includes the general contractor's ultimate control over the project. 7 26 P.2d 427, 4*2
(Utah 1986); see also Pinnacle Homes, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n. 2007 I' 1 App 368, *.21. 173 P.3d 20S.
K 32 In general, Argonaut cannot be described as a statutory employer merely because it participated in the OCIP. In
order for a statutory employer relationship to exist, the employer must procure the work to be done, retain supervision
and control, and the work must be part of the employer's trade or business. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-lU3(7)(a)(n).
Argonaut was not the statutory employer of Iverson in this case because Argonaut did not procure the services of
Iverson, did not have ultimate control over Iverson's work, and was not in the trade or business of construction.
f 33 In contrast, the WCF correctly contended that Wadman was Iverson's statutory employer. Wadman hired Iverson
to complete the steel work and therefore procured Iverson's services. Wadman also exercised control over the project
by supervising Iverson's work. Finally, Wadman's line of trade and business was construction, and thus erecting the
steel part of the building was part of its trade and business. Because Wadman satisfies all the elements in section
34A-2:H)3(7)(a)(ii), it is the statutory employer of Mr. Searle.
1] 34 Even if the level of supervision exercised by Wadman was uncertain, an inference of supervision would still
automatically arise because the work being performed was part of the employer's business. Benm it, ^26 P.2d at 432.
In Beniielj, we determined that even though general contractors frequently delegate a substantial amount of work to
subcontractors, the general contractor remains responsible so long as the subcontractor's work is a part or process of
the general contractor's business. [c[_ In this case, the steel construction performed by Iverson was part of Wadman's
general business of construction and an inference of control arose because Wadman was the general contractor.
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T| 35 Argonaut claims that Iverson already had coverage through the WCF arid therefore the statutory employer doctrine did not apply Argonaut also contends that the WCF, having paid Mr Searle's claim, had the right to seek
reimbursement of unpaid premiums from Iverson, and therefore Iverson had coverage through the WCF The WCF
counters these arguments, stating that the insurance coverage Iverson received from the WCF did not cover the Middle
School project and that Argonaut, not the WCF, received premiums for the Middle School project
l\ h % 36 Typically, an employee cannot reach through the layers of employers any further than the first-insured
contractor Jmobsai x Indus Commn. ^38 P 2d 6:>S 661 (Utah Ct \pp 198 7* Section 34A 2 J0i(7)(e) states that
the statutory employer doctrine is applicable to contractors and subcontractors unless "the employer who procures
woik to be done by the contractor or subcontractor obtains and relies on a valid certification of the contractor's or
subcontractor's compliance with Section 34A-2-201 " Section 34A-2-201 provides
*287 An employer shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for its employees by
(1) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with th|ie Workers' Compensation Fund,
(2) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with atiy stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of workers' compensation insurance m this state, or
(3) obtaining approval from the division m accordance with Section 34A-2 201 5 to pay direct compensation as a
self-insured employei m amount, in the manner, and when due as provided for [by statute]
K 37 Iverson did not provide Wadman with a certificate of compliance with self ion 34 \ 2 201 for the Middle School
project It could not have because it informed the WCF that Iverson's employees working on the Middle School project
would not need to be covered by the WCF while they were working on the project
1[ 38 Iverson did, however, provide some documentation of the WCF coverage to Wadman Under the OCIP, all
subcontractors and contractors were required to provide proof of 34A-2-201 compliance for off-site activities m order
to enroll in the OCIP Iverson had to demonstrate compliance with the off-site insurance requirement by showing that
it had coveiage through the WCF for off-site jobs, which it did This coverage did not preclude Iverson from being a
statutory employee for the Middle School project since Wadman never received information that Iverson had other
insurance for the project Utah Code \nn § 34A-2 10^(7)(e) To the contrary, Wadman requested that Iverson reduce
its bid m anticipation of the OCIP, not Iverson's usual insurance covering all work-related incidents on-site, and paid
the premium for Iverson to be coveied under the OCIP Wadman informed Iverson that insurance would be provided,
and Iverson acted upon this belief In this case, Wadman did not rely on a certificate of insurance from Iverson, and
therefore the statutory employer doctrine applies
K 39 As for Argonaut's argument that Iverson actually had coverage through the WCF because the WCF chose to pay
Mr Searle's claim and could then seek reimbursement from Iverson for unpaid premiums, we find that it is without
merit If Argonaut's position was the law, employers that failed to enroll subcontractors m the OCIP could presumably
escape statutory employer liability if the WCF chose to voluntarily pay injured workers Wadman should not be allowed to avoid responsibility as the statutory employer of Iverson Because Wadman procured Iverson's services and
retained supervision and control over Iverson's work and because Iverson's work was part of the business of Wadman,
we hold that Wadman was the statutory employer of Iverson and theiefore the Statutory employer of Mr Searle
H 40 In addition to finding Wadman to be the statutory employer of Iversori, we must determine if Argonaut, as
Wadman's insurance provider, was required to pay workers' compensation benefits to Mr Searle Neither party contests that Wadman was properly enrolled m the OCIP The renewed policy between Argonaut and Wadman became
effective September 8, 2001, several months before the accident In the absence of the policy later becoming invalid,
the policy requires that Argonaut pay workers' compensation insurance benefit^ for all of Wadman's employees The

© 2 0 1 0 Thomson Reuters No Claim to Ong US Gc^v Works

Page 12
210 P.3d 277, 626 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2009 UT 18
(Cite as: 210 P.3d 277)
Supplemental General Conditions for OCIP does state that failure to follow procedure, such as verifying a subcontractor is enrolled, may result in the termination of coverage. The effect of this document on the policy, however, is
unclear. In any case, Argonaut is required by law to give notice to Wadman of any policy cancellation. Section
34A-2-205(l)(b) states that a workers' compensation insurance policy "is in effect from inception until canceled by
filing with the division or its designee a notification of cancellation in the form prescribed by the division within ten
days after the cancellation of a policy." Since no notice was given to Wadman by Argonaut of the insurance policy
being cancelled, the policy is still valid. Because Wadman's policy with Argonaut was still valid and Mr. Searle was
the statutory employee of Wadman, Argonaut must pay Mr. Searle's compensation benefits.
*288 CONCLUSION
II41 We find that Wadman did not have agency authority for Argonaut, that Iverson's employees were not loaned, and
that Argonaut did not have a responsibility to ensure that Iverson was properly enrolled in the OCIP. We also find that
there was no contract between Argonaut and Iverson. Argonaut still had a responsibility to provide insurance coverage
for Mr. Searle, however, because Iverson and Mr. Searle were the statutory employees of Wadman and Argonaut was
Wadman's insurance provider. Consequently, we reverse the district court decision granting Argonaut summary
judgment and remand for action consistent with this opinion.
H 42 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice WILKINS, and Justice PARRISH concur
in Justice NEHRING's opinion.
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